 



Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group                    M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft                                                      IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved)                                    S. Turner
Intended status: Standard Track                                    sn3rd
Expires: July 9, 2017                                            S. Kent
                                                                     BBN
                                                         January 5, 2017


               A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
        Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
                 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-21

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
   to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
   Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
   known as BGPsec.  BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
   Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
   is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
   requirement to provide security for BGP.  The goal of BGPsec is to
   provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
   cryptographic primitives.  The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
   by this profile are issued to routers within an Autonomous System. 
   Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. 
   These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
   Identifier Delegation extension.  An EE certificate of this type
   asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
   authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
   AS(es) specified in the certificate.  This document also profiles the
   format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
   certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
   This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
   RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
 


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   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1  BGPsec Router Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.1.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.2.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields .  5
         3.1.3.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
         3.1.3.2.  Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
         3.1.3.3.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.4.  IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.5.  AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile  . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI  . .  7
   4.  Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 


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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
   certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
   Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec.  Such certificates are
   termed "BGPsec Router Certificates".  The holder of the private key
   associated with a BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send
   secure route advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es)
   named in the certificate.  A router holding the private key is
   authorized to send route advertisements (to its peers) identifying
   the router's ASN as the source of the advertisements.  A key property
   provided by BGPsec is that every AS along the AS PATH can verify that
   the other ASes along the path have authorized the advertisement of
   the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). 

   This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
   [RFC5280]; thus this document updates [RFC6487].  It establishes
   requirements imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a
   BGPsec Router Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for
   certificate fields and extensions for the certificate to be valid in
   this context.  This document also profiles the certification requests
   used to acquire BGPsec Router Certificates.  Finally, this document
   specifies the Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation
   procedures for these certificates.

1.1.  Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates"
   [RFC6487], "BGPsec Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol],
   "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security
   Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating
   the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4"
   [RFC5492].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

2.  Describing Resources in Certificates

   Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the
   products generated by RPKI entities.  IANA issues a Certification
   Authority (CA) certificate to each Regional Internet Registry (RIR). 
   The RIR, in turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service
   Provider (ISP).  The ISP in turn issues EE Certificates to itself to
   enable verification of signatures on RPKI signed objects.  The CA
 


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   also generates Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).  These CA and EE
   certificates are referred to as "Resource Certificates", and are
   profiled in [RFC6487].  [RFC6480] envisioned using Resource
   Certificates to enable verification of Manifests [RFC6486] and Route
   Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].  ROAs and Manifests include
   the Resource Certificates used to verify them.

                +---------+   +------+
                | CA Cert |---| IANA |
                +---------+   +------+
                         \    
                      +---------+   +-----+
                      | CA Cert |---| RIR |
                      +---------+   +-----+
                              \
                             +---------+   +-----+
                             | CA Cert |---| ISP |
                             +---------+   +-----+
                              / |            | |
                   +-----+   /  |            | |   +-----+
                   | CRL |--+   |            | +---| ROA |
                   +-----+      |            |     +-----+
                                |            |   +----------+
                       +----+   |            +---| Manifest |
                     +-| EE |---+                +----------+
                     | +----+
                     +-----+
                                Figure 1


   This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is
   referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate".  The purpose of this
   certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
   appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484].  The issuance of BGPsec
   Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
   CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
   specified in [RFC6487]).  Further, the algorithms used to generate
   RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and
   the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router
   Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
   [RFC7935]).  The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to be able to
   process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed with
   algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].  BGPsec Router
   Certificates are used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec
   certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a
   BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers
   process these); BGPsec Router Certificates are not used to process
   Manifests and ROAs or verify signatures on Certificates or CRLs.
 


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   This document enumerates only the differences between this profile
   and the profile in [RFC6487].  Note that BGPsec Router Certificates
   are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process
   described in [RFC6916].

3.  Updates to [RFC6487]

3.1  BGPsec Router Certificate Fields

   A BGPsec Router Certificate is consistent with the profile in
   [RFC6487] as modified by the specifications in this section.  As
   such, it is a valid X.509 public key certificate and consistent with
   the PKIX profile [RFC5280].  The differences between this profile and
   the profile in [RFC6487] are specified in this section.

3.1.1.  Subject 

   Common name encoding options that are supported are printableString
   and UTF8String.  For BGPsec Router Certificates, it is RECOMMENDED
   that the common name attribute contain the literal string "ROUTER-"
   followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded as eight
   hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute contain the
   32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) encoded as
   eight hexadecimal digits.  If there is more than one AS number, the
   choice of which to include in the common name is at the discretion of
   the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more than one router
   (hence the private key is shared among these routers), the choice of
   the router ID used in this name is at the discretion of the Issuer.

3.1.2.  Subject Public Key Info

   Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].

3.1.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

3.1.3.1.  Basic Constraints

   BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension
   must not be present, as per [RFC6487].

3.1.3.2.  Extended Key Usage 

   BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU)
   extension.  As specified in [RFC6487] this extension must be marked
   as non-critical.  This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router
   Certificates:


 


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     id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

     id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }

   A BGPsec router MUST require the extended key usage extension to be
   present in a BGPsec Router Certificate it receives.  If multiple
   KeyPurposeId values are included, the BGPsec routers need not
   recognize all of them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is
   present.  BGPsec routers MUST reject certificates that do not contain
   the BGPsec Router EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage
   OID defined in [RFC5280].

3.1.3.3.  Subject Information Access 

   This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be
   omitted.

3.1.3.4.  IP Resources

   This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be
   omitted.

3.1.3.5.  AS Resources

   Each BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource
   Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of
   [RFC6487].  The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST
   include one or more AS numbers, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be
   specified.

3.2.  BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile

   Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487].  The only differences between this
   profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are:

    o The Basic Constraints extension:

      If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the cA boolean if set to TRUE.

    o The Extended Key Usage extension:

      If included, id-kp-bgpsec-router MUST be present (see Section
      3.1).  If included, the CA MUST honor the request for id-kp-
      bgpsec-router.


 


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    o The Subject Information Access extension:

      If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the request to include the
      extension.

    o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field is specified in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-
      algs].

    o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr-
      bgpsec-algs].

3.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Validation 

   The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is
   identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
   [RFC6487] (and any RFC that updates that procedure), as modified
   below.  For example, in step 3: "The certificate contains all fields
   that MUST be present" - refers to the fields that are required by
   this specification.

   The differences are as follows:

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec Router EKU
      defined in Section 3.1.3.2.

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource
      extension.

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier
      Delegation extension.

    o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the subjectPublicKeyInfo
      described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].

   NOTE: BGPsec RPs will need to support the algorithms in [ID.sidr-
   bgpsec-algs], which are used to validate BGPsec signatures, as well
   as the algorithms in [RFC7935], which are needed to validate
   signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI
   CRLs.

3.4.  Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI

   As described in Section 1, the primary function of BGPsec route
   certificates in the RPKI is for use in the context of certification
   of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec protocol.

 


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   The private key associated with a router EE certificate may be used
   multiple times in generating signatures in multiple instances of the
   BGPsec_Path Attribute Signature Segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. 
   I.e., the BGPsec router certificate is used to validate multiple
   signatures.

   BGPsec router certificates are stored in the issuing CA's repository,
   where a repository following RFC6481 MUST use a .cer filename
   extension for the certificate file.

4.  Design Notes 

   The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
   Certificate profile as specified in [RFC7935].  As a result, many of
   the design choices herein are a reflection of the design choices that
   were taken in that prior work.  The reader is referred to [RFC6484]
   for a fuller discussion of those choices.

   CAs are required by the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] to issue
   properly formed BGPsec Router Certificates regardless of what is
   present in the certification request so there is some flexibility
   permitted in the certificate requests:

    o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore,
      requests to issue a CA certificate result in EE certificates;

    o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore,
      requests for Key Usage extension values keyCertSign and cRLSign
      result in certificates with neither of these values;

    o BGPsec Router Certificates always include the BGPsec Rouer EKU
      value; therefore, request without the value result in certificates
      with the value; and,

    o BGPsec Router Certificates never include the Subject Information
      Access extension; therefore, request with this extension result in
      certificates without the extension.

   Note that this behavior is similar to the CA including the AS
   Resource Identifier Delegation extension in issued BGPsec Router
   Certificates despite the fact it is not present in the request.

5. Implementation Considerations

   This document permits the operator to include a list of ASNs in a
   BGPsec Router Certificate. In that case, the router certificate would
   become invalid if any one of the ASNs is removed from any superior CA
   certificate along the path to a trust anchor.  Operators could choose
 


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   to avoid this possibility by issuing a separate BGPsec Router
   Certificate for each distinct ASN, so that the router certificates
   for ASNs that are retained in the superior CA certificate would
   remain valid.

6.  Security Considerations 

   The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply.

   A BGPsec Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
   [RFC6487], because the cryptographic algorithms used are different.
   Consequently, a RP needs to identify the EKU to determine the
   appropriate Validation constraint.

   A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
   encompass routers.  It is a building block BGPsec and is used to
   validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of
   Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].  Thus its essential
   security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to
   a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment
   hierarchy.

   Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two
   key identifier extensions (i.e., Subject Key Identifier and Issuer
   Key Identifier) included in BGPsec certificates.  However as noted in
   [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required property of one-way
   hash functions when used to generate key identifiers.  Regardless,
   hash collisions are unlikely, but they are possible and if detected
   an operator should be alerted.  A subject key identifier collision
   might cause the incorrect certificate to be selected from the cache,
   resulting in a failed signature validation.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry
   for PKIX.  One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes
   from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id-
   mod-bgpsec-eku).  The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in
   Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for
   PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry.  These OIDs were assigned
   before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA.  No IANA
   allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in
   those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor.

8.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
   Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on.  In
 


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   addition, the efforts of Matt Lepinski were instrumental in preparing
   this work.  Additionally, we'd like to thank Rob Austein, Roque
   Gagliano, Richard Hansen, Geoff Huston, David Mandelberg, Sandra
   Murphy, and Sam Weiller for their reviews and comments.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
             10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
             Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, DOI
             10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border
             Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI
             10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
             Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
             (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
             "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

   [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
             X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI
             10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
             Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key
             Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935, August
             2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.

   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec
             Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol,
             work-in-progress.
 


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   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, &
             Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in-
             progress.

9.2.  Informative References 

   [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
             RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.

   [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
             Path in BGP", RFC 5123, DOI 10.17487/RFC5123, February
             2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5123>.

   [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
             with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February 2009,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.

   [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
             Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
             February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
             Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI
             10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
             Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, DOI 10.17487/RFC6484, February
             2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.

   [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
             "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

   [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
             Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
             2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.







 


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Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) }

     DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

     BEGIN

     -- EXPORTS ALL --

     -- IMPORTS NOTHING --

     -- OID Arc --

     id-kp  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

     -- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage --

     id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }

     END

Authors' Addresses

   Mark Reynolds 
   Island Peak Software
   328 Virginia Road
   Concord, MA 01742

   Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com

   Sean Turner
   sn3rd

   EMail: sean@sn3rd.com

   Stephen Kent
   Raytheon BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA 02138

   Email: kent@bbn.com






Reynolds, et al.          Expires July 9, 2017                 [Page 12]
