


Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR)                             G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                             G. Michaelson
Intended status: Informational                                     APNIC
Expires: May 15, 2011                                  November 11, 2010


 Validation of Route Origination using the Resource Certificate PKI and
                                  ROAs
                 draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-10.txt

Abstract

   This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
   (ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
   Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes
   advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol.

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   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 15, 2011.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection . . . . . . . . 6
   4.  Disavowal of Routing Origination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  Route Validation Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9





































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1.  Introduction

   This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
   (ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
   Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the
   origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
   [RFC4271].

   The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are
   aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure.
   Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX
   profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS
   identifiers [RFC3779].  A Resource Certificate describes an action by
   an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous
   System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by
   the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public
   key contained in the Resource Certificate.  The RPKI is structured
   such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current
   resource allocation or assignment.  This is further described in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].

   ROAs are digitally signed objects that bind an address to an AS
   number, signed by the address holder.  A ROA provides a means of
   verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized a particular
   AS to originate routes in the inter-domain routing environment for
   that address block.  ROAs are described in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].  ROAs are intended to fit within the
   requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing.

   This document describes the semantic interpretation of a ROA, with
   particular reference to application in inter-domain routing relating
   to the origination of routes, and the intended scope of the authority
   that is conveyed in the ROA.


2.  ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route

   A "route" is unit of information that associates a set of
   destinations described by an IP address prefix with a set of
   attributes of a path to those destinations, as defined in section 1.1
   of [RFC4271].

   A route's "origin AS" is defined as follows: If the final path
   segment of the AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE, the "origin AS" is the
   first element of the sequence (i.e. the AS in the rightmost position
   with respect to the position of octets in the protocol message).  If
   the AS_PATH contains a path segment of type AS_SET, indicating that
   the route is an aggregate, then the "origin AS" cannot be determined.



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   In terms of validation of a route in the context of a routing
   environment, the address prefix value and the origin AS are used in
   the ROA validation operation.

   It is assumed here that a Relying Party (RP) has access to a local
   cache of the complete set of valid ROAs when performing validation of
   a route.  (Valid ROAs are defined as ROAs that are determined to be
   syntactically correct and are signed using a signature that can be
   verified using the RPKI, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].)
   The RP needs to match a route to one or more candidate valid ROAs in
   order to determine a validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used
   to determine the appropriate local actions to perform on the route.

   This approach to route origination validation uses a generic model of
   "positive" attestation that has an associated inference that routes
   that cannot be validated within the RPKI framework would
   conventionally be interpreted by an RP as "invalid".  However, the
   considerations of accommodating environments of partial adoption of
   the use of ROAs, where only a subset of validly advertised address
   prefixes have associated published ROAs within the structure of the
   RPKI, imply some modification to this model of positive attestation.
   In the context of route validation it is assumed that once an address
   prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA specifically encompasses
   all address prefixes that are more specific than that described in
   the ROA.  Thus, any route for a more specific address prefix than
   that described by any valid ROA that does not itself have a matching
   valid ROA can be considered to be "invalid".  However, routes objects
   for address prefixes that are not fully described by any single ROA,
   i.e., those route objects whose address prefixes may be an aggregate
   of address prefixes described in a valid ROA, or have address
   prefixes where there is no intersection with any ROA, and are not
   matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA, cannot be
   reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario.
   Such routes have a validation outcome of "unknown".

   An abstract attribute of a route can be determined as the outcome of
   this validation procedure, namely a "validity state"
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].  The "validity state" of a route, with
   a prefix and an origin AS as defined above, when using single ROA for
   determining this validity state is summarized in the following table:











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        Route    matching  non-matching
   Prefix   AS->   AS         AS
    V           +---------+---------+
   Non-         | unknown | unknown |
   Intersecting |         |         |
                +---------+---------+
   Covering     | unknown | unknown |
   Aggregate    |         |         |
                +---------+---------+
   match ROA    | valid   | invalid |
   prefix       |         |         |
                +---------+---------+
   More         |         |         |
   Specific     | invalid | invalid |
   than ROA     |         |         |
                +---------+---------+

               Route's Validity State

   In an environment of a collection of valid ROAs, a route's validity
   state is considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid"
   outcome.  It's validity state is considered to be "invalid" if one
   (or more) ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no ROAs provide a
   "valid" outcome.  Its validity state is considered to be "unknown"
   (or, synonymously, "not found" [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] when no
   valid ROA can produce either a "valid" or an "invalid" validity state
   outcome.

   A route validity state is defined by the following procedure:


      1.  Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
          either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address
          prefix in the route.  This selection forms the set of
          "candidate ROAs."

      2.  If the set of candidate ROAs is empty, then the procedure
          stops with an outcome of "unknown" (or, synonymously, "not
          found", as used in [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]).

      3.  If the route's origin AS can be determined and any of the set
          of candidate ROAs has an asID value that matches the origin AS
          in the route, and the route's address prefix matches a
          ROAIPAddress in the ROA (where "match" is defined as where the
          route's address precisely matches the ROAIPAddress, or where
          the ROAIPAddress includes a maxLength element, and the route's
          address prefix is a more specific prefix of the ROAIPAddress,
          and the route's address prefix length value is less than or



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          equal to the ROAIPAddress maxLength value) then the procedure
          halts with an outcome of "valid".

      4.  Otherwise, the procedure halts with an outcome of "invalid".


3.  Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection

   Within the framework of the abstract model of the operation of inter-
   domain routing using BGP [RFC4271], a received prefix announcement
   from a routing peer is compared to all announcements for this prefix
   received from other routing peers and a route selection procedure is
   used to select the "best" route from this candidate set.

   The route's validity state, described in Section 2, of "valid",
   "invalid" or "unknown" may be used as part of the determination of
   the local degree of preference, in which case the local order of
   preference is as follows:
      "valid" is to be preferred over
      "unknown", which is to be preferred over
      "invalid".

   It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be
   undertaken by a routing entity in processing those routes with
   "unknown" validity states.  Due to considerations of partial use of
   ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public Internet,
   it is advised that local policy settings should not result in
   "unknown" validity state outcomes being considered as sufficient
   grounds to reject a route outright from further consideration as a
   local "best" route.

   It is a matter of local routing policy as to whether routes with an
   "invalid" validity state are considered to be ineligible for further
   consideration in a route selection process.  A possible consideration
   here is one of potential circularity of dependence: If the
   authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of
   any certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at
   an address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA,
   then the repository can only be accessed by the RP once a route for
   the prefix has been accepted by the RP's local routing domain.  It is
   also noted that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different
   to the propagation time of routes, and that routes may be learned by
   an RP's routing system before the RP's local RPKI repository cache
   picks up the associated ROAs and recognises them as having a validity
   state of "valid" within the RPKI.






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4.  Disavowal of Routing Origination

   A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized
   an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain
   routing system.  It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an
   authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority
   to originate a route for an address prefix.  This is achieved by
   using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must not be used
   in any routing context.  Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA
   such that it may be used to identify non-routed networks
   [IANA.AS-Registry].

   A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS0-ROA) is an attestation by the
   holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more
   specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context.

   The route validation procedure, described in Section 2, will provide
   a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and origin
   AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" validation
   outcome if used in isolation.  Consequently, an AS0-ROA has a lower
   relative preference than any other ROA that has a routable AS as its
   subject.  This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0-ROA to declare a
   default condition that any route that is equal to, or more specific
   than the prefix to be considered to be invalid, while also allowing
   other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid origination
   authorizations for more specific prefixes.

   By convention, an AS0-ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for
   IPv4 addresses and a maxlength value of 128 for IPv6 addresses,
   although in terms of route validation the same outcome would be
   achieved with any valid maxLength value, or even if the maxLength
   element were to be omitted from the ROA.

   Also by convention, an AS0-ROA should be the only ROA issued for a
   given address prefix, although again this is not a strict
   requirement.  An AS0-ROA MAY coexist with ROAs that have different
   subject AS values, although in such cases the presence or otherwise
   of the AS0-ROA does not alter the route's validity state in any way.


5.  Route Validation Lifetime

   The "lifetime" of a validation outcome refers to the time period
   during which the original validation outcome can be still applied.
   The implicit assumption here is that when the validation lifetime
   expires the routing object should be re-tested for validity.

   The validation lifetime for a ROA is controlled by the Valid times



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   specified in the End Entity (EE) Certificate used to sign the ROA,
   and the valid times of those certificates in the certification path
   used to validate the EE Certificate.  A ROA validation "expires" at
   the Validity To field of the signing EE certificate, or at such a
   time when there is no certification path that can validate the ROA.
   A ROA issuer may elect to prematurely invalidate a ROA by revoking
   the EE certificate that was used to sign the ROA.


6.  Security Considerations

   ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing
   a ROA, in that a ROA implicitly invalidates all routes that have more
   specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength, and
   all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection of
   ROAs for this prefix.

   A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of
   ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's
   prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,
   in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid routes during ROA
   generation.

   ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one
   origin AS, then if the address prefix holder authorises multiple AS's
   to originate routes for a given address prefix, then is necessary for
   a ROA be generated for every such authorized AS.


7.  IANA Considerations

   [There are no IANA Considerations.]


8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful contributions of
   John Scudder and Stephen Kent in preparing this document, and also
   the contributions of many members of the SIDR Working Group in
   response to presentations of this material in SIDR WG sessions.  The
   authors also acknowledge prior work undertaken by Tony Bates, Randy
   Bush, Tony Li, and Yakov Rekhter as the validation outcomes described
   here reflect the authentication outcomes and semantics of origin AS
   verification described in [exI-D.bates].  A number of validation
   concepts relating to a route's "validity state" presented in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], edited by Pradosh Mohapatra et al, have
   be used in this document.




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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
              progress), October 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
              Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to
              Support Secure Internet Routing",
              draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress),
              October 2009.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
              Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
              draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-00 (work in progress),
              July 2010.

   [IANA.AS-Registry]
              IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",
              March 2010.

   [exI-D.bates]
              Bates, T., Bush, R., Li, T., and Y. Rekhter, "DNS-based
              NLRI origin AS verification in BGP",
              draft-bates-bgp4-nlri-orig-verif-00.txt (work in
              progress), January 1998.








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Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: gih@apnic.net


   George Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: ggm@apnic.net







































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