


MARF Working Group                                            H. Fontana
Internet-Draft                                          January 18, 2012
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 21, 2012


     Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format
                 draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-10

Abstract

   This memo registers an extension report type to the Abuse Reporting
   Format (ARF), affecting multiple registries, for use in generating
   receipt-time reports about messages that fail one or more email
   message authentication checks.

Status of this Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 21, 2012.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Email Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Base 64  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.4.  Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  ARF Extension for Authentication Failure Reporting . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  New ARF Feedback Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  New ARF Header Field Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.2.1.  Required For All Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.2.2.  Optional For All Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.2.3.  Required For DKIM Reports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.4.  Optional For DKIM Reports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.5.  Required For ADSP Reports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.6.  Required For SPF Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Authentication Failure Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Syntax For Added ARF Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.1.  Updates to ARF Feedback Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.2.  Updates to ARF Header Field Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.1.  Inherited Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.2.  Forgeries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.3.  Automatic Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.4.  Envelope Sender Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     6.5.  Reporting Multiple Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     6.6.  Redaction of Data in DKIM Reports  . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   Appendix B.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     B.1.  Example Use of ARF Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21















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1.  Introduction

   The Abuse Reporting Format ([ARF]) defines a message format for
   sending reports of abuse in the messaging infrastructure, with an eye
   towards automating both the generation and consumption of those
   reports.  There is now also a desire to extend the ARF format to
   include reporting of messages that fail to authenticate using known
   message authentication methods, such as DomainKeys Identified Mail
   ([DKIM]) and Sender Policy Framework ([SPF]), as these are sometimes
   evidence of abuse that can be detected and reported through automated
   means.  The same mechanism can be used to convey forensic information
   about the specific reason the authentication method failed.  Thus,
   this memo presents such extensions to ARF that allow for detailed
   reporting of message authentication method failures.





































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2.  Definitions

2.1.  Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].

2.2.  Email Architecture

   This memo uses some terms whose definitions and descriptions can be
   found in [EMAIL-ARCH].

2.3.  Base 64

   base64 is defined in Section 4 of [BASE64].

   The values that are base64 encodings MAY contain FWS for formatting
   purposes as per the usual header field wrapping defined in [MAIL].
   During decoding, any characters not in the base64 alphabet are
   ignored so that such line wrapping does not harm the value.  The ABNF
   token "FWS" is defined in [DKIM].  No other extensions to the valid
   base64 character set are permitted.

2.4.  Technologies

   There are technologies in email security that provide authentication
   services and some that do authorization.  These are often conflated.
   A discussion of this that is useful for establishing context can be
   found in Section 1.5.2 in [AUTH-RESULTS].





















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3.  ARF Extension for Authentication Failure Reporting

   The current report format defined in [ARF] lacks some specific
   features required to do effective email authentication failure
   reporting.  This section defines extensions to ARF to accommodate
   this requirement.

   A single report describes a single email authentication failure.
   Multiple reports MAY be used to report multiple failures for a single
   message.

3.1.  New ARF Feedback Type

   A new feedback type of "auth-failure" is defined as an extension per
   Section 7.3 of [ARF].

   A message that uses this feedback type has the following modified
   header field requirements for the second (machine-parseable) [MIME]
   part of the report:

   Authentication-Results:  Syntax as specified in [AUTH-RESULTS].
      Furthermore, [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at
      most once; for this extension, this field MUST be present, but
      MUST reflect only a single authentication method's result.

   Original-Envelope-Id:  Syntax as specified in [ARF].  Furthermore,
      [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once;
      for this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where
      that value is available, to aid in diagnosing of the
      authentication failure.

   Original-Mail-From:  Syntax as specified in [ARF].  Furthermore,
      [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once;
      for this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where
      that value is available, to aid in diagnosing of the
      authentication failure.

   Source-IP:  Syntax as specified in [ARF].  Furthermore, [ARF]
      specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for
      this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where that
      value is available, to aid in diagnosing of the authentication
      failure.

   Reported-Domain:  Syntax as specified in [ARF].  Furthermore, [ARF]
      specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for
      this extension, this field MUST be present if such a value is
      available.




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   Delivery-Result:  As specified in Section 3.2.2.  This field is
      OPTIONAL, but MUST NOT appear more than once.  If present, it
      SHOULD indicate the outcome of the message in some meaningful way,
      but MAY be set to "other" for local policy reasons.

   The third MIME part of the message is either of type "message/rfc822"
   (as defined in [MIME-TYPES]) or "text/rfc822-headers" (as defined in
   [REPORT]) and contains a copy of the entire header block from the
   original message.  This part MUST be included (contrary to [REPORT],
   which makes it optional).

   For privacy reasons, report generators might need to redact portions
   of a reported message such as an identifier or address associated
   with the end user whose complaint action resulted in the report.  A
   discussion of relevant issues and a suggested method for doing so can
   be found in [I-D.IETF-MARF-REDACTION].

3.2.  New ARF Header Field Names

   The following new ARF field names are defined as extensions to
   Section 3.1 of [ARF].

3.2.1.  Required For All Reports

   Auth-Failure:  Indicates the failure from an email authentication
      method that is being reported.  The list of valid values is
      enumerated in Section 3.3.

3.2.2.  Optional For All Reports

   Delivery-Result:  The final message disposition that was enacted by
      the Administrative Management Domain (ADMD) generating the report
      and MUST NOT appear more than once.  Possible values are:

      delivered:  The message was delivered (not specific as to where).

      spam:  The message was delivered to the recipient's spam folder
         (or equivalent).

      policy:  The message was not delivered to the intended inbox due
         to a failure from an email authentication method.  The specific
         action taken is not specified.

      reject:  The message was rejected.







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      other:  The message had a final disposition not covered by one of
         the above values.

3.2.3.  Required For DKIM Reports

   DKIM-Domain:  The domain that signed the message, taken from the "d="
      tag of the signature.

   DKIM-Identity:  The identity of the signature that failed
      verification, taken from the "i=" tag of the signature.

   DKIM-Selector:  The selector of the signature that failed
      verification, taken from the "s=" tag of the signature.

3.2.4.  Optional For DKIM Reports

   DKIM-Canonicalized-Header:  A base64 encoding of the canonicalized
      header of the message as generated by the verifier.

   DKIM-Canonicalized-Body:  A base64 encoding of the canonicalized body
      of the message as generated by the verifier.  The encoded content
      MUST be limited to those octets that contribute to the DKIM body
      hash (i.e., the value of the "l=" tag; see Section 3.7 of [DKIM]).

   If DKIM-Canonicalized-Header and DKIM-Canonicalized-Body encode
   redacted data, they MUST NOT be included.  Otherwise, they SHOULD be
   included.  The data presented there have to be exactly the
   canonicalized header and body as defined by [DKIM] and computed at
   the verifier.  This is because these fields are intended to aid in
   identifying message alterations that invalidate DKIM signatures in
   transit.  Including redacted data in them renders the data unusable.
   (See also Section 3.1 and Section 6.6 for further discussion.)

3.2.5.  Required For ADSP Reports

   DKIM-ADSP-DNS:  Includes the Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP)
      policy used to obtain the verifier's ADSP result.  This MUST be
      formatted per Section 4.2.1 of [ADSP].

3.2.6.  Required For SPF Reports

   SPF-DNS:  This field MUST appear once for every Sender Policy
      Framework ([SPF]) SPF record used to obtain the SPF result.  It
      MUST include the DNS RRTYPE used, the DNS domain from which the
      record was retrieved, and the content of that record.  The syntax
      is defined in Section 4.





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3.3.  Authentication Failure Types

   The list of defined email authentication failure types used in the
   "Auth-Failure:" header field (defined above), is as follows:

   adsp:  The message did not conform to the author domain's published
      [ADSP] signing practises.  The DKIM-ADSP-DNS field MUST be
      included in the report.

   bodyhash:  The body hash in the signature and the body hash computed
      by the verifier did not match.  The DKIM-Canonicalized-Body field
      SHOULD be included in the report (see Section 3.2.4).

   revoked:  The DKIM key referenced by the signature on the message has
      been revoked.  The DKIM-Domain and DKIM-Selector fields MUST be
      included in the report.

   signature:  The DKIM signature on the message did not successfully
      verify against the header hash and public key.  The DKIM-Domain
      and DKIM-Selector fields MUST be included in the report, and the
      DKIM-Canonicalized-Header field SHOULD be included in the report
      (see Section 3.2.4).

   spf:  The evaluation of the author domain's SPF record produced a
      "none", "fail", "softfail", "temperror" or "permerror" result.
      ("none" is not strictly a failure per [SPF], but a service that
      demands successful SPF evaluations of clients could treat it like
      a failure.)

   Supplementary data MAY be included in the form of [MAIL]-compliant
   comments.  For example, "Auth-Failure: adsp" could be augmented by a
   comment to indicate that the failed message was rejected because it
   was not signed when it should have been.  See Appendix B for an
   example.

















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4.  Syntax For Added ARF Header Fields

   The [ABNF] definitions for the new fields are as follows:

     auth-failure = "Auth-Failure:" [CFWS]
                    ( "adsp" / "bodyhash" / "revoked" /
                      "signature" / "spf" ) [CFWS] CRLF
                  ; "CFWS" is defined in [MAIL]

     delivery-result = "Delivery-Result:" [CFWS]
                       ( "delivered" / "spam" /"policy" /
                         "reject" / "other" ) [CFWS] CRLF

     dkim-header = "DKIM-Canonicalized-Header:" [CFWS]
                   base64string CRLF
                 ; "base64string" is defined in [DKIM]

     dkim-sig-domain = "DKIM-Domain:" [CFWS] dkim-domain [CFWS]
                       CRLF
                     ; "dkim-domain" is defined in [DKIM]

     dkim-identity = "DKIM-Identity:" [CFWS] [ local-part ] "@"
                     domain-name [CFWS] CRLF
                   ; "local-part" is defined in [MAIL]

     dkim-selector = "DKIM-Selector:" [CFWS] selector [CFWS] CRLF
                   ; "selector" is defined in [DKIM]

     dkim-adsp-dns = "DKIM-ADSP-DNS:" [CFWS]
                     quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF
                   ; "quoted-string" is defined in [MAIL]

     dkim-body = "DKIM-Canonicalized-Body:" [CFWS]
                 base64string CRLF

     dkim-selector-dns = "DKIM-Selector-DNS:" [CFWS]
                         quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF

     spf-dns = "SPF-DNS:" [CFWS] ( "txt" / "spf" ) [CFWS] ":" [CFWS]
               domain [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF











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5.  IANA Considerations

   As required by [IANA], this section contains registry information for
   the extension to [ARF].

5.1.  Updates to ARF Feedback Types

   The following feedback type is added to the Feedback Report Type
   Values registry:

       Feedback Type: auth-failure
       Description: email authentication failure report
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current

5.2.  Updates to ARF Header Field Names

   The following headers are added to the Feedback Report Header Fields
   registry:

       Field Name: Auth-Failure
       Description: Type of email authentication method failure
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current


       Field Name: Delivery-Result
       Description: Final disposition of the subject message
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current


       Field Name: DKIM-ADSP-DNS
       Description: Retrieved DKIM ADSP record
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current









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       Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Body
       Description: Canonicalized body, per DKIM
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current


       Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Header
       Description: Canonicalized header, per DKIM
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current


       Field Name: DKIM-Domain
       Description: DKIM signing domain from "d=" tag
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current


       Field Name: DKIM-Identity
       Description: Identity from DKIM signature
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current


       Field Name: DKIM-Selector
       Description: Selector from DKIM signature
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current


       Field Name: DKIM-Selector-DNS
       Description: Retrieved DKIM key record
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current





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       Field Name: SPF-DNS
       Description: Retrieved SPF record
       Multiple Appearances: No
       Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
       Published in: [this memo]
       Status: current













































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6.  Security Considerations

   Security issues with respect to these reports are similar to those
   found in [DSN].

6.1.  Inherited Considerations

   Implementers are advised to consider the Security Considerations
   sections of [DKIM], [ADSP] [SPF] and [ARF].

6.2.  Forgeries

   These reports can be forged as easily as ordinary Internet electronic
   mail.  User agents and automatic mail handling facilities (such as
   mail distribution list exploders) that wish to make automatic use of
   DSNs of any kind should take appropriate precautions to minimize the
   potential damage from denial-of-service attacks.

   Security threats related to forged DSNs include the sending of:

   a.  A falsified email authentication method failure notification when
       the message was in fact delivered to the indicated recipient;

   b.  Falsified signature information, such as selector, domain, etc.

   Perhaps the simplest means of mitigating this threat is to assert
   that these reports should themselves be signed with something like
   DKIM.  On the other hand, if there's a problem with the DKIM
   infrastructure at the verifier, signing DKIM failure reports might
   produce reports that aren't trusted or even accepted by their
   intended recipients.

6.3.  Automatic Generation

   Automatic generation of these reports by verifying agents can cause a
   denial-of-service attack when a large volume of e-mail is sent that
   causes email authentication failures for whatever reason.

   Limiting the rate of generation of these messages might be
   appropriate but threatens to inhibit the distribution of important
   and possibly time-sensitive information.

   In general ARF feedback loop terms, it is suggested that report
   generators only create these (or any) ARF reports after an out-of-
   band arrangement has been made between two parties.  This mechanism
   then becomes a way to adjust parameters of an authorized abuse report
   feedback loop that is configured and activated by private agreement
   rather than starting to send them automatically based solely on



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   discovered data in the DNS.

6.4.  Envelope Sender Selection

   In the case of transmitted reports in the form of a new message, it
   is necessary to consider the construction and transmission of the
   message so as to avoid amplification attacks, deliberate or
   otherwise.  See Section 5 of [ARF] for further information.

6.5.  Reporting Multiple Incidents

   If it is known that a particular host generates abuse reports upon
   certain incidents, an attacker could forge a high volume of messages
   that will trigger such a report.  The recipient of the report could
   then be innundated with reports.  This could easily be extended to a
   distributed denial-of-service attack by finding a number of report-
   generating servers.

   The incident count referenced in [ARF] provides a limited form of
   mitigation.  The host generating reports may elect to send reports
   only periodically, with each report representing a number of
   identical or near-identical incidents.  One might even do something
   inverse-exponentially, sending reports for each of the first ten
   incidents, then every tenth incident up to 100, then every 100th
   incident up to 1000, etc. until some period of relative quiet after
   which the limitation resets.

   The use of this for "near-identical" incidents in particular causes a
   degradation in reporting quality, however.  If for example a large
   number of pieces of spam arrive from one attacker, a reporting agent
   might decide only to send a report about a fraction of those
   messages.  While this averts a flood of reports to a system
   administrator, the precise details of each incident are similarly not
   sent.

6.6.  Redaction of Data in DKIM Reports

   This memo requires that the canonicalized header and body be returned
   without being subject to redaction when a DKIM failure is being
   reported.  This is necessary to ensure that the returned
   canonicalized forms are useful for debugging as they must be compared
   to the equivalent form at the signer.  If a message is altered in
   transit, and the returned data are also redacted, the redacted
   portion and the altered portion may overlap, rendering the comparison
   results meaningless.  However, unredacted data can leak information
   the reporting entity considers to be private.  It is for this reason
   the return of the canonicalized forms is not required.




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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [ABNF]     Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", RFC 5234, January 2008.

   [ADSP]     Allman, E., Delany, M., Fenton, J., and J. Levine, "DKIM
              Sender Signing Practises", RFC 5617, August 2009.

   [ARF]      Shafranovich, Y., Levine, J., and M. Kucherawy, "An
              Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports", RFC 5965,
              August 2010.

   [AUTH-RESULTS]
              Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating
              Message Authentication Status", RFC 5451, April 2009.

   [BASE64]   Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [DKIM]     Crocker, D., Hansen, T., and M. Kucherawy, "DomainKeys
              Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", RFC 6376,
              September 2011.

   [I-D.IETF-MARF-REDACTION]
              Falk, JD., "Redaction of Potentially Sensitive Data from
              Mail Abuse Reports", I-D draft-ietf-marf-redaction,
              March 2011.

   [IANA]     Alvestrand, H. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, May 2008.

   [KEYWORDS]
              Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [MAIL]     Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
              October 2008.

   [MIME]     Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
              Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.

   [MIME-TYPES]
              Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
              November 1996.



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   [REPORT]   Vaudreuil, G., "The Multipart/Report Content Type for the
              Reporting of Mail System Administrative Messages",
              RFC 3462, January 2003.

   [SPF]      Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
              for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
              RFC 4408, April 2006.

7.2.  Informative References

   [DSN]      Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format
              for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464,
              January 2003.

   [EMAIL-ARCH]
              Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
              October 2008.


































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Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to acknowledge the following for their review and
   constructive criticism of this proposal: Frank Ellerman, J.D. Falk,
   Scott Kitterman, John Levine, Mike Markley, Kelly Wanser, Murray
   Kucherawy and Alessandro Vesely.













































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Appendix B.  Example

   This section contains an example of the use of the extension defined
   by this memo.

B.1.  Example Use of ARF Extension Headers

   An ARF-formatted report using the proposed ARF extension fields:

   Message-ID: <433689.81121.example@mta.mail.receiver.example>
   From: "SomeISP Antispam Feedback" <feedback@mail.receiver.example>
   To: arf-failure@sender.example
   Subject: FW: You have a new bill from your bank
   Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2011 15:15:59 -0500 (CDT)
   MIME-Version: 1.0
   Content-Type: multipart/report;
     boundary="------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg";
     report-type=feedback-report
   Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

   --------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg
   Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
   Content-Disposition: inline
   Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

   This is an authentication failure report for an email message
   received from a.sender.example on 8 Oct 2011 20:15:58 +0000 (GMT).
   For more information about this format please see [this memo].

   --------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg
   Content-Type: message/feedback-report
   Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

   Feedback-Type: auth-failure
   User-Agent: Someisp!Mail-Feedback/1.0
   Version: 1
   Original-Mail-From: anexample.reply@a.sender.example
   Original-Envelope-Id: o3F52gxO029144
   Authentication-Results: mta1011.mail.tp2.receiver.example;
    dkim=fail (bodyhash) header.d=sender.example
   Auth-Failure: bodyhash
   DKIM-Canonicalized-Body: VGhpcyBpcyBhIG1lc3NhZ2UgYm9keSB0
     aGF0IGdvdCBtb2RpZmllZCBpbiB0cmFuc2l0LgoKQXQgdGhlIHNhbWU
     gdGltZSB0aGF0IHRoZSBib2R5aGFzaCBmYWlscyB0byB2ZXJpZnksIH
     RoZQptZXNzYWdlIGNvbnRlbnQgaXMgY2xlYXJseSBhYnVzaXZlIG9yI
     HBoaXNoeSwgYXMgdGhlClN1YmplY3QgYWxyZWFkeSBoaW50cy4gIElu
     ZGVlZCwgdGhpcyBib2R5IGFsc28gY29udGFpbnMKdGhlIGZvbGxvd2l
     uZyB0ZXh0OgoKICAgUGxlYXNlIGVudGVyIHlvdXIgZnVsbCBiYW5rIG



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     NyZWRlbnRpYWxzIGF0CiAgIGh0dHA6Ly93d3cuc2VuZGVyLmV4YW1wb
     GUvCgpXZSBhcmUgaW1wbHlpbmcgdGhhdCwgYWx0aG91Z2ggbXVsdGlw
     bGUgZmFpbHVyZXMKcmVxdWlyZSBtdWx0aXBsZSByZXBvcnRzLCBhIHN
     pbmdsZSBmYWlsdXJlIGNhbiBiZQpyZXBvcnRlZCBhbG9uZyB3aXRoIH
     BoaXNoaW5nIGluIGEgc2luZ2xlIHJlcG9ydC4K
   DKIM-Domain: sender.example
   DKIM-Identity: @sender.example
   DKIM-Selector: testkey
   Arrival-Date: 8 Oct 2011 20:15:58 +0000 (GMT)
   Source-IP: 192.0.2.1
   Reported-Domain: a.sender.example
   Reported-URI: http://www.sender.example/

   --------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg
   Content-Type: text/rfc822-headers
   Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

   Authentication-Results: mta1011.mail.tp2.receiver.example;
    dkim=fail (bodyhash) header.d=sender.example;
    spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=anexample.reply@a.sender.example
   Received: from smtp-out.sender.example
    by mta1011.mail.tp2.receiver.example
    with SMTP id oB85W8xV000169;
    Sat, 08 Oct 2011 13:15:58 -0700 (PDT)
   DKIM-Signature: v=1; c=relaxed/simple; a=rsa-sha256;
    s=testkey; d=sender.example; h=From:To:Subject:Date;
    bh=2jUSOH9NhtVGCQWNr9BrIAPreKQjO6Sn7XIkfJVOzv8=;
    b=AuUoFEfDxTDkHlLXSZEpZj79LICEps6eda7W3deTVFOk4yAUoqOB
    4nujc7YopdG5dWLSdNg6xNAZpOPr+kHxt1IrE+NahM6L/LbvaHut
    KVdkLLkpVaVVQPzeRDI009SO2Il5Lu7rDNH6mZckBdrIx0orEtZV
    4bmp/YzhwvcubU4=
   Received: from mail.sender.example
    by smtp-out.sender.example
    with SMTP id o3F52gxO029144;
    Sat, 08 Oct 2011 13:15:31 -0700 (PDT)
   Received: from internal-client-001.sender.example
    by mail.sender.example
    with SMTP id o3F3BwdY028431;
    Sat, 08 Oct 2011 13:15:24 -0700 (PDT)
   Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2011 16:15:24 -0400 (EDT)
   Reply-To: anexample.reply@a.sender.example
   From: anexample@a.sender.example
   To: someuser@receiver.example
   Subject: You have a new bill from your bank
   Message-ID: <87913910.1318094604546@out.sender.example>

   --------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg--




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   Example 1: Example ARF report using these extensions

   This example ARF message is making the following assertion:

   o  DKIM verification of the signature added within "example.com"
      failed

   o  The cause for the verification failure was a mismatch between the
      body contents observed at the verifier and the body hash contained
      in the signature.









































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Author's Address

   Hilda L. Fontana
   3579 E. Foothill Blvd., suite 282
   Pasadena, CA  91107
   US

   Phone: +1 626 676 8852
   Email: hilda@hfontana.com










































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