


Network Working Group                                            G. Zorn
Internet-Draft                                               Network Zen
Intended status: Informational                                  T. Zhang
Expires: January 10, 2011                           Advista Technologies
                                                               J. Walker
                                                       Intel Corporation
                                                              J. Salowey
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                            July 9, 2010


 Vendor Specific RADIUS Attributes for the Delivery of Keying Material
                    draft-zorn-radius-keywrap-16.txt

Abstract

   This document defines a set of vendor specific RADIUS Attributes
   designed to allow both the secure transmission of cryptographic
   keying material and strong authentication of any RADIUS message.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 10, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 1]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Specification of Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Keying-Material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  MAC-Randomizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  Message-Authentication-Code  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17


















Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 2]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


1.  Introduction

   Many remote access deployments (for example, deployments utilizing
   wireless LAN technology) require the secure transmission of
   cryptographic keying material from a RADIUS [RFC2865] server to a
   network access point.  Typically, this material is produced as a by-
   product of an EAP [RFC3748] authentication and is of a form that may
   be used in virtually any cryptographic algorithm after appropriate
   processing.

   This document defines a set of vendor specific RADIUS Attributes that
   can be used to securely transfer cryptographic keying material using
   standard techniques with well understood security properties.  In
   addition, the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute may be used to
   provide strong authentication for any RADIUS message, including those
   used for accounting and dynamic authorization.

   Discussion of this draft may be directed to the authors.


2.  Specification of Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  Attributes

   The following subsections describe sub-attributes which are
   transmitted in one or more RADIUS attributes of type Vendor-Specific
   [RFC2865].  The Vendor-ID field of the Vendor-Specific Attribute(s)
   MUST be set to decimal 9 (Cisco).  The general format of the
   attributes is:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type (26)   |    Length   |         Vendor ID
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
        Vendor ID (cont'd)           |   Sub-type (1)|   Sub-length  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                            Value...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+







Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 3]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010




      Type

         26 for vendor specific

      Length

         Length of entire attribute including type and length field

      Vendor ID

         4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9

      Sub-type

         Attribute sub-type of 1

      Sub-length

         Length of the sub attribute including the sub-type and sub-
         length fields

      Value

         Value of the sub attribute.

   This specification concerns the following sub-attributes:

   o  Keying-Material

   o  MAC-Randomizer

   o  Message-Authentication-Code

3.1.  Keying-Material

   Description

      This Attribute MAY be used to transfer cryptographic keying
      material from a RADIUS server to a client.

      It MAY be sent in request messages (e.g., Access-Request, etc.),
      as well; if the Keying-Material Attribute is present in a request,
      it SHOULD be taken as a hint by the server that the client prefers
      this method of key delivery over others, the server is not
      obligated to honor the hint, however.  When the Keying-Material
      Attribute is included in a request message the Key ID, Lifetime,



Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 4]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      IV and Key Material fields MAY be omitted.

      If the client requires the use of the Keying-Material Attribute
      for keying material delivery and it is not present in the Access-
      Accept or Access-Challenge message, the client MAY ignore the
      message in question and end the user session.

      Any packet that contains a Keying-Material Attribute MUST also
      include the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute.

      Any packet that contains an instance of the Keying-Material
      Attribute MUST NOT contain an instance of any other attribute
      (e.g., MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys [RFC2548], Tunnel-Password [RFC2868],
      etc.) encapsulating identical keying material.

      The Keying-Material Attribute MUST NOT be used to transfer long-
      lived keys (i.e., passwords) between RADIUS servers and clients.

      A summary of the Keying-Material attribute format is shown below.
      The fields are transmitted from left to right.































Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 5]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type (26)   |    Length   |   Vendor ID
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
        Vendor ID (cont'd)           |   Sub-type (1)|    Sub-length |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     String ID  ("radius:app-key=")
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)     |    Enc Type   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             App ID                            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             KEK ID
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                KEK ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                KEK ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                KEK ID (cont'd)                      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             KM ID
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                KM ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                KM ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                KM ID (cont'd)                       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                            Lifetime                           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               IV
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                  IV (cont'd)                        |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                              Data
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



      Type

         26 for vendor specific




Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 6]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      Length

         Length of entire attribute including type and length field

      Vendor ID

         4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9

      Sub-type

         Attribute sub-type of 1

      Sub-length

         Length of the sub attribute including the sub-type and sub-
         length fields

      String-ID

         The ASCII characters "radius:app-key=" without quotes or null
         termination.

      Enc Type

         The Enc Type field indicates the method used to encrypt the
         contents of the Data field.  This document defines only one
         value (decimal) for this field:

            0 AES Key Wrap with 128-bit KEK [RFC3394]

         Implementations MUST support Enc Type 0 (AES Key Wrap with 128-
         bit KEK).

         Implementation Note

            A shared secret is used as the key-encrypting-key (KEK) for
            the AES key wrap algorithm.  Implementations SHOULD provide
            a means to provision a key (cryptographically separate from
            the normal RADIUS shared secret) to be used exclusively as a
            KEK.

      App ID

         The App ID field is 4 octets in length and identifies the type
         of application for which the key material is to be used.  This
         allows for multiple keys for different purposes to be present
         in the same message.  This document defines two values for the
         App ID:



Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 7]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


            0 Unspecified

            1 EAP MSK

         further specification of the content of this field is outside
         the scope of this document.

      KEK ID

         The KEK ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an
         identifier for the KEK.  The KEK ID MUST refer to an encryption
         key of a type and length appropriate for use with the algorithm
         specified by the Enc Type field (see above).  This key is used
         to protect the contents of the Data field (below).  Further
         specification of the content of this field is outside the scope
         of this document.

      KM ID

         The KM ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an
         identifier for the contents of the Data field.  The KM ID MAY
         be used by communicating parties to identify the material being
         transmitted.  The combination of App ID and KM ID MUST uniquely
         identify the keying material between the parties utilizing it.
         The KM ID is assumed to be known to the parties that derived
         the keying material.  If the KM ID is not used it is set to 0.
         Further specification of the content of this field is outside
         the scope of this document.

      Lifetime

         The Lifetime field is an integer [RFC2865] representing the
         period of time (in seconds) for which the keying material is
         valid.

         Note: Applications using this value SHOULD consider the
         beginning of the lifetime to be the point in time when the
         keying material is first used.

      IV

         The length of the IV field depends upon the value of the Enc
         Type field, but is fixed for any given value thereof.  When the
         value of the Enc Type field is 0 (decimal), the IV field MUST
         be 8 octets in length (as illustrated above) and the value of
         the IV field MUST be as specified in [RFC3394].





Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 8]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      Data

         The Data field is variable length and contains the actual
         encrypted keying material.

3.2.  MAC-Randomizer

   Description

      The MAC-Randomizer Attribute MUST be present in any message that
      includes an instance of the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute.
      The Random field MUST contain a 32 octet random number which
      SHOULD satisfy the requirements of [RFC4086].

      Implementation Note

         The Random field MUST be filled in before the MAC is computed.
         The MAC-Randomizer Attribute SHOULD be placed at the beginning
         of the RADIUS message if possible.

      A summary of the MAC-Randomizer attribute format is shown below.
      The fields are transmitted from left to right.


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type (26)   |    Length   |   Vendor ID
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
        Vendor ID (cont'd)           |   Sub-type (1)|    Sub-length |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     String ID  ("radius:random-nonce=")
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)                     |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                           Random...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+








Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011                [Page 9]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      Type

         26 for vendor specific

      Length

         Length of entire attribute including type and length field

      Vendor ID

         4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9

      Sub-type

         Attribute sub-type of 1

      Sub-length

         Length of the sub attribute including the sub-type and sub-
         length fields

      String-ID

         The ASCII characters "radius:random-nonce=" without quotes or
         null termination.

      Random

         This field MUST contain a 32 octet random number which SHOULD
         satisfy the requirements of [RFC4086].

3.3.  Message-Authentication-Code

   Description

      This Attribute MAY be used to "sign" messages to prevent spoofing.
      If it is present in a request, the receiver should take this a
      hint that the sender prefers the use of this Attribute for message
      authentication; the receiver is not obligated to do so, however.

      The Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be included in any
      message that contains a Keying-Material attribute.

      Any packet that contains an instance of the Message-
      Authentication-Code Attribute SHOULD NOT contain an instance of
      the Message-Authenticator Attribute [RFC3579].  If both attributes
      are to be included in a message (e.g., for backward compatibility
      in a network containing both old and new clients), the value of



Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 10]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be computed first.

      If any message is received containing an instance of the Message-
      Authentication-Code Attribute, the receiver MUST calculate the
      correct value of the Message-Authentication-Code and silently
      discard the packet if the computed value does not match the value
      received.

      If a received message contains an instance of the MAC-Randomizer
      Attribute (Section 3.2), the received MAC-Randomizer Attribute
      SHOULD be included in the computation of the Message-
      Authentication-Code Attribute sent in the response, as described
      below.

      A summary of the Message-Authentication-Code attribute format is
      shown below.  The fields are transmitted from left to right.



































Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 11]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type (26)   |    Length   |           Vendor ID
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
        Vendor ID (cont'd)           |   Sub-type (1)|    Sub-length |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       String ID  ("radius:message-authenticator-code=")
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                              String ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
              String ID (cont'd)     |   MAC Type    |  MAC Key ID
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                       MAC Key ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                             MAC Key ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                             MAC Key ID (cont'd)
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                             MAC Key ID (cont'd)     |    MAC
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             MAC (cont'd) ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



      Type

         26 for vendor specific

      Length

         Length of entire attribute including type and length field






Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 12]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      Vendor ID

         4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9

      Sub-type

         Attribute sub-type of 1

      Sub-length

         Length of the sub attribute including the sub-type and sub-
         length fields

      String-ID

         The ASCII characters "radius:message-authenticator-code="
         without quotes or null termination.

      MAC Type

         The MAC Type field specifies the algorithm used to create the
         value in the MAC field.  This document defines six values for
         the MAC Type field:

            0 HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS.180-2.2002] [RFC2104]

            1 HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS.180-2.2002] [RFC4231]

            2 HMAC-SHA-512 [FIPS.180-2.2002] [RFC4231]

            3 CMAC-AES-128 [NIST.SP800-38B]

            4 CMAC-AES-192 [NIST.SP800-38B]

            5 CMAC-AES-256 [NIST.SP800-38B]

         Implementations MUST support MAC Type 0 (HMAC-SHA-1).

      MAC Key ID

         The MAC Key ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an
         identifier for the key.  The MAC Key ID MUST refer to a key of
         a type and length appropriate for use with the algorithm
         specified by the MAC Type field (see above).  Further
         specification of the content of this field is outside the scope
         of this document.





Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 13]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


      MAC

         Both the length and value of the MAC field depend upon the
         algorithm specified by the value of the MAC Type field.  If the
         algorithm specified is HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-
         512, the MAC field MUST be 20, 32 or 64 octets in length,
         respectively.  If the algorithm specified is CMAC-AES-128,
         CMAC-AES-192 or CMAC-AES-256, the MAC field SHOULD be 64 octets
         in length.  The derivation of the MAC field value for all the
         algorithms specified in this document is identical, except for
         the algorithm used.  There are differences, however, depending
         upon whether the MAC is being computed for a request message or
         a response.  These differences are detailed below, with the
         free variable HASH-ALG representing the actual algorithm used.

         Request Messages

            For requests (e.g., CoA-Request [RFC5176], Accounting-
            Request [RFC2866], etc.), the value of the MAC field is a
            hash of the entire packet except the Request Authenticator
            in the header of the RADIUS packet, using a shared secret as
            the key, as follows.

            MAC = MAC-ALG(Key, Type + Identifier + Length + Attributes)
            where '+' represents concatenation

            The MAC-Randomizer Attribute (Section 3.2) MUST be included
            in any request in which the Message-Authentication-Code
            Attribute is used.  The Random field of the MAC-Randomizer
            Attribute MUST be filled in before the value of the MAC
            field is computed.

            If the Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute is included in a
            client request, the server SHOULD ignore the contents of the
            Request Authenticator.

            Implementation Notes

               When the hash is calculated, both the MAC field of the
               Message-Authenticator-Code attribute and the String field
               of the Message-Authenticator Attribute (if any) MUST be
               considered to be zero-filled.

               Implementations SHOULD provide a means to provision a key
               (cryptographically separate from the normal RADIUS shared
               secret) to be used exclusively in the generation of the
               Message-Authentication-Code.




Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 14]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


         Response Messages

            For responses (e.g., CoA-ACK [RFC5176], Accounting-Response
            [RFC2866], etc.), the value of the MAC field is a hash of
            the entire packet except the Response Authenticator in the
            header of the RADIUS packet using a shared secret as the
            key, as follows.

            MAC = HASH-ALG(Key, Type + Identifier + Length + Attributes)
            where '+ ' represents concatenation

            If the request contained an instance of the MAC-Randomizer
            Attribute and the responder wishes to include an instance of
            the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute in the
            corresponding response, then the MAC-Randomizer Attribute
            from the request MUST be included in the response.

            If the Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute is included in a
            server response, the client SHOULD ignore the contents of
            the Response Authenticator.

            Implementation Notes

               When the hash is calculated, both the MAC field of the
               Message-Authenticator-Code attribute and the String field
               of the Message-Authenticator Attribute (if any) MUST be
               considered to be zero-filled.

               The Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be created
               and inserted in the packet before the Response
               Authenticator is calculated.

               Implementations SHOULD provide a means to provision a key
               (cryptographically separate from the normal RADIUS shared
               secret) to be used exclusively in the generation of the
               Message-Authentication-Code.


4.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not define any actions for IANA.


5.  Security Considerations

   It is RECOMMENDED in this memo that two new keys, a key encrypting
   key and a message authentication key, be shared by the RADIUS client
   and server.  If implemented, these two keys MUST be different from



Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 15]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


   each other and SHOULD NOT be based on a password.  These two keys
   SHOULD be cryptographically independent of the RADIUS shared secret
   used in calculating the Response Authenticator [RFC2865], Request
   Authenticator [RFC2866] [RFC5176] and Message-Authenticator Attribute
   [RFC3579]; otherwise if the shared secret is broken, all is lost.

   To avoid the possibility of collisions, the same MAC key SHOULD NOT
   be used with more than 2^(n/2) messages, where 'n' is the length of
   the MAC value in octets.

   If a packet that contains an instance of the Keying-Material
   Attribute also contains an instance of another, weaker key transport
   attribute (e.g., MS-MPPE-Recv-Key [RFC2548]) encapsulating identical
   keying material, then breaking the weaker attribute might facilitate
   a known-plaintext attack against the KEK.


6.  Contributors

   Hao Zhou, Nancy Cam-Winget, Alex Lam, Paul Funk and John Fossaceca
   all contributed to this document.


7.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks (in no particular order) to Keith McCloghrie, Kaushik Narayan,
   Murtaza Chiba, Bill Burr, Russ Housley, David McGrew, Pat Calhoun,
   Joel Halpern, Jim Schaad and Greg Weber for useful feedback.


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS.180-2.2002]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002.

   [NIST.SP800-38B]
              Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
              Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", May 2005.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.



Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 16]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC2866]  Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

   [RFC2868]  Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege,
              M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol
              Support", RFC 2868, June 2000.

   [RFC3394]  Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
              (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.

   [RFC3579]  Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
              Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4231]  Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
              224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
              RFC 4231, December 2005.

   [RFC5176]  Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
              Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
              Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 5176,
              January 2008.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2548]  Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
              RFC 2548, March 1999.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.














Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 17]

Internet-Draft     RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA         July 2010


Authors' Addresses

   Glen Zorn
   Network Zen
   1463 East Republican Street
   #358
   Seattle, WA  98112
   US

   Email: gwz@net-zen.net


   Tiebing Zhang
   Advista Technologies
   5252 Orange Ave, Suite 108
   Cypress, CA  90630
   US

   Phone: +1 (949) 242 0391
   Email: tzhang@advistatech.com


   Jesse Walker
   Intel Corporation
   JF3-206
   2111 N.E. 25th Ave
   Hillsboro, OR  97214-5961
   US

   Phone: +1 (503) 712-1849
   Email: jesse.walker@intel.com


   Joseph Salowey
   Cisco Systems
   2901 Third Avenue
   SEA1/6/
   Seattle, WA  98121
   US

   Phone: +1 (206) 256-3380
   Email: jsalowey@cisco.com









Zorn, et al.            Expires January 10, 2011               [Page 18]


