NETWORK WG                                            Sean Turner, IECA 
Internet Draft                             Russ Housley, Vigil Security 
Intended Status: Standards Track                           June 3, 2010 
Expires: December 3, 2010 
 
 
                                      
               Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices 
               draft-turner-additional-cms-ri-choices-06.txt 


Abstract 

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) allows revocation information 
   to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData, 
   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The 
   preferred format for revocation information is the Certificate 
   Revocation List (CRL), but an extension mechanism supports other 
   revocation information formats.  This document defines two additional 
   revocation information formats for Online Certificate Status Protocol 
   (OCSP) responses and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol 
   (SCVP). 

Status of this Memo 

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 3, 2010. 



 
 
 
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Copyright Notice 

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
   document authors.  All rights reserved. 

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 
   publication of this document. Please review these documents 
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 
   to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 
   described in the Simplified BSD License. 

1. Introduction 

   The RevocationInfoChoices type defined in [CMS] provides a set of 
   revocation status information alternatives, which allows revocation 
   information to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData, 
   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The intent 
   is to provide information sufficient to determine whether the 
   certificates and attribute certificates carried elsewhere in the CMS-
   protected content have been revoked.  There may be more revocation 
   status information than necessary or there may be less revocation 
   status information than necessary. 

   X.509 Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [PROFILE] are the primary 
   source of revocation status information, but any other revocation 
   information format can be supported.  This document specifies two 
   other formats: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses 
   [OCSP] and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) 
   requests and responses [SCVP]. 

   Section 2 discusses the RevocationInformation structure.  Section 3 
   defines a mechanism to carry OCSP responses.  Section 4 defines a 
   mechanism to carry SCVP requests and responses.  Appendix A provides 
   the normative ASN.1 syntax for the two mechanisms. 

1.1. Requirements Terminology 

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in [WORDS]. 



 
 
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2. Revocation Information 

   For convenience, the ASN.1 definition of the RevocationInfoChoices 
   type from [CMS] is repeated here: 

   RevocationInfoChoices ::= SET OF RevocationInfoChoice 

   RevocationInfoChoice ::= CHOICE { 
     crl        CertificateList, 
     other  [1] IMPLICIT OtherRevocationInfoFormat } 

   OtherRevocationInfoFormat ::= SEQUENCE { 
     otherRevInfoFormat  OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
     otherRevInfo        ANY DEFINED BY otherRevInfoFormat } 

   The other CHOICE MUST be used to convey OCSP responses, SCVP 
   requests, and SCVP responses. 

   This document defines the id-ri arc under which the revocation 
   information formats are defined.  The id-ri object identifier is: 

   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) } 

   NOTE: Numbers 1 and 3 were assigned to CRL and Delta CRL.  These two 
   numbers are not used because these formats use the 
   RevocationInfoChoice crl CHOICE when included in CMS [CMS]. 

3. OCSP Response 

   To carry an OCSP response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set to  
   id-ri-ocsp-response, which has the following ASN.1 definition: 

   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 } 

   In this case, otherRevInfo MUST carry the OCSP response using the 
   OCSPResponse type defined in [OCSP].  The responseStatus field MUST 
   be successful and the responseBytes field MUST be present.  

4. SCVP Request and Response 

   Unlike OSCP, SCVP permits unprotected and protected responses, where 
   protected responses can be digitally signed or include message 
   authentication codes.  While this provides more flexibility, it 
   complicates implementations when an SCVP response can be validated by 
   entities other than the entity that generated the SCVP request.  If a 
   lower layer provides authentication and integrity for the client-
 
 
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   server interaction and the response is not protected, then a third 
   party cannot validate the response because there is no way to know 
   that the response was returned over a protected connection.  If a 
   message authentication code is used, then the third party will be 
   unable to validate the message authentication code because it does 
   not possess the necessary private key.  For these reasons, SCVP 
   responses sent to a third party MUST be signed by the SCVP server so 
   that the third party can validate them. 

   SCVP response validation requires matching it to the SCVP request.  
   This means that the SCVP request MUST always be included with the 
   response.  SCVP permits the client to retain the response, and SCVP 
   permits the request to be returned in the response (in the requestReq 
   field).  The request need not be protected for matching to be 
   performed; nonces and certIds can be checked. 

   To carry the SCVP request and response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set 
   to id-ri-scvp, which has the following ASN.1 definition: 

   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 } 

   In this case, the otherRevInfo MUST carry both the SCVP request and 
   response with the following structure: 

   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE { 
     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL, 
     response     ContentInfo } 

   The SCVPReqRes has the following fields: 

   o request contains the SCVP request.  It contains the unprotected 
     request, authenticated request, or the signed request.  The 
     request MUST be present if the response does not include the 
     requestRef fullRequest field. 

   o response contains the SCVP response.  It MUST contain the signed 
     response.  Additionally, the responseStatus MUST be okay.   
     Unprotected and authenticated responses MUST NOT be included. 

5. Security Considerations 

   The security considerations of [CMS], [CMS-ASN], [OCSP], [SCVP], and 
   [PROFILE-ASN] apply. 

   To locally store unprotected or authenticated SCVP responses, a 
   client can encapsulate the unprotected or authenticated SCVP response 
   in a SignedData.  It is a matter of local policy whether these SCVP 
 
 
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   responses that are encapsulated and signed by the client are 
   considered valid by another entity. 

6. IANA Considerations 

   This document makes use of object identifiers.  These object 
   identifiers are defined in an arc delegated by IANA to the PKIX 
   Working Group.  No further action by IANA is necessary for this 
   document or any anticipated updates. 

7. References 

7.1. Normative References 

   [CMS]         Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 5652, 
                 September 2009. 

   [CMS-ASN]     Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for 
                 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 
                 5911, June 2010.  

   [OCSP]        Meyers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and 
                 C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure 
                 Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, 
                 June 1999. 

   [PROFILE-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the 
                 Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 
                 5912, June 2010.  

   [SCVP]        Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and 
                 W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol 
                 (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007. 

   [WORDS]       Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 

   [X.680]       ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                 Notation One. 

   [X.681]       ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                 Notation One: Information Object Specification. 



 
 
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   [X.682]       ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                 Notation One: Constraint Specification. 

   [X.683]       ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                 Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1 
                 Specifications, 2002. 

7.2. Informative References 

   [PROFILE]     Cooper, D. et. al., "Internet X.509 Public Key 
                 Infrastructure Certificate and Certification 
                 Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 

Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules 

   Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the 
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in 
   [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1. 

   Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the 
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in 
   [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the 
   2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix 
   A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix 
   A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict. 

A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module 

   CMS-Other-RIs-2009-88 
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) 
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-88(63) 
     } 

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 

   BEGIN 

   -- EXPORTS ALL 







 
 
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   IMPORTS 

   -- FROM CMS [CMS] 

   ContentInfo 
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 
       smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } 

   ; 

   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) } 

   -- RevocationInfoChoice for OCSP response 
   -- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat 
   -- signed OCSP response included in otherRevInfo 

   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 } 

   -- RevocationInfoChoice for SCVP response 
   -- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat 
   -- SCVPReqRes included in otherRevInfo 

   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 } 

   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE { 
     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL, 
     response     ContentInfo } 

   END 

A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module 

   CMS-Other-RIs-2009-02 
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) 
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-93(64) 
     } 

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 

   BEGIN 

   -- EXPORT ALL 



 
 
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   IMPORTS 

   -- FROM [PROFILE-ASN] 

   OCSPResponse 
     FROM OCSP-2009 
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) 
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48) } 

   -- FROM [CMS-ASN] 

   ContentInfo, OTHER-REVOK-INFO 
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) } 

   ; 

   -- Defines OCSP and SCVP formats for RevocationInfoChoice 

   SupportedOtherRevokInfo OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= { 
     ri-ocsp-response | 
     ri-scvp, 
     ... } 

   ri-ocsp-response OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= { 
     OCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-ocsp-response } 

   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) } 

   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 } 

   ri-scvp OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= { 
     SCVPReqRes IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-scvp } 

   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 } 

   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE { 
     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL, 
     response     ContentInfo } 

   END 




 
 
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Authors' Addresses 

   Sean Turner 
   IECA, Inc. 
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 
   Fairfax, VA 22031 
   USA 

   EMail: turners@ieca.com 

   Russ Housley 
   Vigil Security, LLC 
   918 Spring Knoll Drive 
   Herndon, VA 20170 
   USA 

   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com 






























 
 
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