MPLS Working Group                                       Dave Allan, Ed. 
Internet Draft                                                 Ericsson 
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: February 2012                                George Swallow Ed. 
                                                      Cisco Systems, Inc 
 
                                                          John Drake Ed. 
                                                                 Juniper 
 
                                                             August 2011 
                                    

     Proactive Connectivity Verification, Continuity Check and Remote 
               Defect indication for MPLS Transport Profile 
                      draft-ietf-mpls-tp-cc-cv-rdi-06 


Abstract 

   Continuity Check, Proactive Connectivity Verification and Remote 
   Defect Indication functionalities are required for MPLS-TP OAM.  
    
   Continuity Check monitors a label switched path for any loss-of-
   continuity defect. Connectivity Verification augments Continuity 
   Check in order to provide confirmation that the desired source is 
   connected to the desired sink. Remote defect indication enables an 
   End Point to report, to its associated End Point, a fault or defect 
   condition that it detects on a pseudo wire, label switched path or 
   Section. 
    
   This document specifies specific extensions to BFD and methods for 
   proactive Continuity Check, Continuity Verification, and Remote 
   Defect Indication for MPLS-TP label switched paths, pseudo wires and 
   Sections using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection as extended by 
   this memo. 
 

Requirements Language 

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [1]. 

Status of this Memo 

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance 
   with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 


 
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Copyright Notice 

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
   document authors.  All rights reserved. 

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 
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   without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. 

Table of Contents 

   1. Introduction...................................................3 
   2. Conventions used in this document..............................4 
   2.1. Terminology..................................................4 
   3. MPLS-TP CC, proactive CV and RDI Mechanism using BFD...........5 
   3.1. Existing Capabilities........................................5 
   3.2. CC, CV, and RDI Overview.....................................6 
   3.3. ACH code points for CC and proactive CV......................7 
   3.4. MPLS-TP BFD CC Message format................................7 
   3.5. MPLS-TP BFD proactive CV Message format......................8 
   3.5.1. Section MEP-ID.............................................9 
   3.5.2. LSP MEP-ID................................................10 
 
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   3.5.3. PW Endpoint MEP-ID........................................10 
   3.6. BFD Session in MPLS-TP terminology..........................11 
   3.7. BFD Profile for MPLS-TP.....................................12 
   3.7.1. Session initiation and Modification.......................13 
   3.7.2. Defect entry criteria.....................................13 
   3.7.3. Defect entry consequent action............................15 
   3.7.4. Defect exit criteria......................................15 
   3.7.5. State machines............................................15 
   3.7.6. Configuration of MPLS-TP BFD sessions.....................18 
   3.7.7. Discriminator values......................................18 
   4. Configuration Considerations..................................18 
   5. Acknowledgments...............................................19 
   6. IANA Considerations...........................................19 
   7. Security Considerations.......................................20 
   8. References....................................................20 
   8.1. Normative References........................................20 
   8.2. Informative References......................................21 
    

1. Introduction 

   In traditional transport networks, circuits are provisioned on two or 
   more switches. Service Providers (SP) need Operations, Administration 
   and Maintenance (OAM) tools to detect mis-connectivity and loss-of-
   continuity of transport circuits. Both pseudo wires (PWs) and MPLS-TP 
   label switched paths (LSPs) [12] emulating traditional transport 
   circuits need to provide the same Continuity Check (CC), proactive 
   Continuity Verification (CV), and Remote Defect Indication (RDI) 
   capabilities as required in RFC 5860[3]. This document describes the 
   use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)[4] for CC, proactive 
   CV, and RDI of a PW, LSP or sub-path maintenance entity (SPME) 
   between two Maintenance Entity Group End Points (MEPs). 

   As described in [13], CC and CV functions are used to detect loss-of-
   continuity (LOC), and unintended connectivity between two MEPs (e.g. 
   mis-merging or mis-connectivity or unexpected MEP).  

   RDI is an indicator that is transmitted by a MEP to communicate to 
   its peer MEP that a signal fail condition exists. RDI is only used 
   for bidirectional LSPs and is associated with proactive CC & CV BFD 
   control packet generation. 

   This document specifies the BFD extension and behavior to satisfy the 
   CC, proactive CV monitoring and the RDI functional requirements for 
   both co-routed and associated bi-directional LSPs. Supported 
   encapsulations include generic alert label (GAL)/generic associated 

 
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   channel (G-ACh), virtual circuit connectivity verification (VCCV) and 
   UDP/IP. Procedures for uni-directional point-to-point (p2p) and 
   point-to-multipoint (p2mp) LSPs are for further study. 

   This document utilizes identifiers for MPLS-TP systems as defined in 
   [9]. Work is on-going in the ITU-T to define a globally-unique 
   semantic for ITU Carrier Codes (ICCs), and future work may extend 
   this document to utilize ICCs as identifiers for MPLS-TP systems. 

   The mechanisms specified in this document are restricted to BFD 
   asynchronous mode. 

    

2. Conventions used in this document 

2.1. Terminology 

ACH: Associated Channel Header 

BFD: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection 

CC: Continuity Check 

CV: Connectivity Verification 

GAL: G-ACh Label 

G-ACh: Generic Associated Channel 

LDI: Link Down Indication 

LKI: Lock Instruct 

LKR: Lock Report 

LSP: Label Switched Path 

LSR: Label Switching Router 

ME:  Maintenance Entity 

MEG: Maintenance Entity Group 

MEP: Maintenance Entity Group End Point 

MIP: Maintenance Entity Group Intermediate Point 

 
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MPLS: Multi-Protocol Label Switching 

MPLS-OAM: MPLS Operations, Administration and Maintenance 

MPLS-TP: MPLS Transport Profile 

MPLS-TP LSP: Uni-directional or Bidirectional Label Switched Path 
representing a circuit 

MS-PW: Multi-Segment PseudoWire 

NMS: Network Management System 

OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance [14] 

PW: Pseudo Wire  

PDU: Protocol Data Unit 

P/F: Poll-Final 

RDI: Remote Defect Indication  

SPME: Sub-Path Maintenance Entity 

TTL: Time To Live 

TLV: Type Length Value 

VCCV: Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification 

3. MPLS-TP CC, proactive CV and RDI Mechanism using BFD 

   This document describes procedures for achieve combined CC, CV and 
   RDI functionality within a single MPLS-TP MEG using BFD. This 
   augments the capabilities that can be provided for MPLS-TP LSPs using 
   existing specified tools and procedures. 

3.1. Existing Capabilities 

   A CC-only mode may be provided via protocols and procedures described 
   in RFC 5885[7] with ACH channel 7. These procedures may be applied to 
   bi-directional LSPs (via the use of the GAL), as well as PWs.  

   Implementations may also interoperate with legacy equipment by 
   implementing RFC 5884[8] for LSPs and RFC 5085[10] for PWs, in 
   addition to the procedures documented in this memo. In accordance 
   with RFC 5586[2], when BFD control packets are encapsulated in an IP 
 
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   header, the fields in the IP header are set as defined in RFC 
   5884[8]. When IP encapsulation is used CV mis-connectivity defect 
   detection can be performed by inferring a globally unique source on 
   the basis of the combination of the source IP address and My 
   Discriminator" fields. 

3.2. CC, CV, and RDI Overview  

   The combined CC, CV, and RDI functionality for MPLS-TP is achieved by 
   multiplexing CC and CV PDUs within a single BFD session. The CV PDUs 
   are augmented with a source MEP ID TLV to permit mis-connectivity 
   detection to be performed by sink MEPs. 

   The interleaving of PDUs is achieved via the use of distinct 
   encapsulations and code points for generic associated channel (G-ACh) 
   encapsulated BFD depending on whether the PDU format is CC or CV:  

  o  CC format: defines a new code point in the Associated Channel 
     Header (ACH) described in RFC 5586[2].This format supports 
     Continuity Check and RDI functionalities.  

  o  CV format: defines a new code point in the Associated Channel 
     Header (ACH) described in RFC 5586[2]. The ACH with "MPLS-TP 
     Proactive CV" code point indicates that the message is an MPLS-TP 
     BFD proactive CV message, and information for CV processing is 
     appended in the form of the source MEP ID TLV. 

   RDI is communicated via the BFD diagnostic field in BFD CC messages, 
   and the diagnostic code field in CV messages MUST be ignored. It is 
   not a distinct PDU. As per [4], a sink MEP SHOULD encode a diagnostic 
   code of "1 - Control detection time expired" when the interval times 
   detect multiplier have been exceeded. A sink MEP SHOULD encode a 
   diagnostic code of "5 - Path Down" as a consequence of the sink MEP 
   receiving LDI. A sink MEP MUST encode a diagnostic code of "XX -
                                                                       - 
   Misconnectivity defect" (to be assigned by IANA) when CV PDU 
   processing indicates a misconnectivity defect. A sink MEP that has 
   started sending diagnostic code 5 SHOULD NOT change it to 1 when the 
   detection timer expires. 
    








 
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3.3. ACH code points for CC and proactive CV 

   Figure 1 illustrates the G-ACh encoding for BFD CC-CV-RDI 
   functionality. 
    
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |0 0 0 1|Version|     Flags     |      BFD CC/CV Code Point     | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
    
       Figure 1: ACH Indication of MPLS-TP CC/CV/RDI 
    

   The first nibble (0001b) indicates the G-ACh as per RFC 5586[2]. 

   The version and the flags are set to 0 as specified in [2]. 

   The code point is either 

   - BFD CC code point = XX1. [XX1 to be assigned by IANA from the PW 
   Associated Channel Type registry.] or, 

   - BFD proactive CV code point = XX2. [XX2 to be assigned by IANA from 
   the PW Associated Channel Type registry.] 

   CC and CV PDUs apply to all pertinent MPLS-TP structures, including 
   PWs, MPLS LSPs (including SPMEs), and Sections. 

   CC and CV operation is simultaneously employed on a maintenance 
   entity (ME) within a single BFD session. The expected usage is that 
   normal operation is to send CC BFD protocol data units (PDUs) 
   interleaved with a CV BFD PDU (augmented with a source MEP-ID and 
   identified as requiring additional processing by the different ACh 
   channel type). The insertion interval for CV PDUs is one per second. 
   Detection of a loss-of-continuity defect is the detect multiplier 
   (fixed at 3 for the CC code point) times the session periodicity. 
   Mis-connectivity defects are detected in a maximum of one second. 
3.4. MPLS-TP BFD CC Message format 

   The format of an MPLS-TP CC Message is shown below. 






 
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    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |0 0 0 1|Version|     Flags     |      BFD CC Code point        | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                                                               | 
   ~                  BFD Control Packet                           ~ 
   |                                                               | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                     Figure 2: MPLS-TP CC Message 
    

   As shown in figure 2, the MPLS-TP CC message consists of the BFD 
   control packet as defined in [4] pre-pended by the G-ACh.  

3.5. MPLS-TP BFD proactive CV Message format 

   The format of an MPLS-TP CV Message is shown below. 

    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |0 0 0 1|Version|     Flags     |       BFD CV Code Point       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                                                               | 
   ~                  BFD Control Packet                           ~ 
   |                                                               | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                                                               | 
   ~                      MEP Source ID TLV                        ~ 
   |                                                               | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
    
                     Figure 3: MPLS-TP CV Message 
    

   As shown in figure 3, the MPLS-TP CV message consists of the BFD 
   control packet as defined in [4] pre-pended by the ACH, and appended 
   by a MEP source ID TLV.  

   A MEP Source ID TLV is encoded as a 2 octet field that specifies a 
   Type, followed by a 2 octet Length Field, followed by a variable    
   length Value field. A BFD session will only use one encoding of the 
   Source ID TLV. 

   The length in the BFD control packet is as per [4]; the length of the 
   MEP Source ID TLV is not included. There are 3 possible Source MEP 

 
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   TLVs (corresponding to the MEP-IDs defined in [9]) [type fields to be 
   assigned by IANA]. The type fields are: 

      X1 - Section MEP-ID 

      X2 - LSP MEP-ID 

      X3 - PW MEP-ID 

   When GAL label is used, the time to live (TTL) field of the GAL MUST 
   be set to at least 1, and the GAL MUST be the end of stack label 
   (S=1) as per [2]. 

   A node MUST NOT change the value in the MEP Source ID TLV. 

   When digest based authentication is used, the Source ID TLV MUST NOT 
   be included in the digest 

3.5.1. Section MEP-ID 

   The IP compatible MEP-IDs for MPLS-TP sections is the interface ID. 
   The format of the Section MEP-ID TLV is: 
    
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |  Type                         |  Length                       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                       MPLS-TP Global_ID                       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    MPLS-TP Node Identifier                    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    MPLS-TP Interface Number                   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
    
                   Figure 4: Section MEP-ID TLV format 
    
   Where the type is of value 'X1' (to be assigned by IANA). The length 
   is the length of the value fields. The MPLS-TP Global ID, Node 
   Identifier and Interface Numbers are as per [9].  
 
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3.5.2. LSP MEP-ID 

   The fields for the LSP MEP-ID is as defined in [9]. This is 
   applicable to both LSPs and SPMEs. This consists of 32-bit MPLS-TP 
   Global ID, the 32-bit Node Identifier, followed by the 16-bit 
   Tunnel_Num (that MUST be unique within the context of the Node 
   Identifier), and the 16-bit LSP_NUM (that MUST be unique with the 
   context of the Tunnel Num). The format of the TLV is: 
    
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |  Type                         |  Length                       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                       MPLS-TP Global_ID                       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    MPLS-TP Node Identifier                    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |           Tunnel_Num          |            LSP_Num            | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  
    
                   Figure 5: LSP MEP-ID TLV format 
    
   Where the type is of value 'X2' (to be assigned by IANA). The length 
   is the length of the value fields. The MPLS-TP Global ID, Node 
   Identifier, Tunnel Num and LSP_Num are as per [9].  
    
3.5.3. PW Endpoint MEP-ID 

   The fields for the MPLS-TP PW Endpoint MEP-ID is as defined in [9]. 
   The format of the TLV is: 

    
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
 
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   |  Type                         |  Length                       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                       MPLS-TP Global_ID                       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    MPLS-TP Node Identifier                    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                             AC_ID                             | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |   AGI Type    |  AGI Length   |      AGI Value                | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   ~                    AGI  Value (contd.)                        ~ 
   |                                                               | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
    

                 Figure 6: PW Endpoint MEP-ID TLV format 
    

   Where the type is value 'X3' (to be assigned by IANA). The length is 
   the length of the following data. The Global ID, Node Identifier and 
   Attachment Circuit (AC)_ID are as per [9]. The Attachment Group 
   Identifier (AGI) Type is as per [6], and the AGI length is the length 
   of the AGI value field. 

3.6. BFD Session in MPLS-TP terminology 

   A BFD session corresponds to a CC and proactive CV OAM instance in 
   MPLS-TP terminology. A BFD session is enabled when the CC and 
   proactive CV functionality is enabled on a configured Maintenance 
   Entity (ME).  

   When the CC and proactive CV functionality is disabled on an ME, the 
   BFD session transitions to the ADMIN DOWN State and the BFD session 
   ends. 

   A new BFD session is initiated when the operator enables or re-
   enables the CC and CV functionality. 

   All BFD state changes and P/F exchanges MUST be done using CC 
   packets. P/F and session state information in CV packets MUST be 
   ignored.  
 
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3.7. BFD Profile for MPLS-TP 

   BFD operates in asynchronous mode utilizing the encapsulation defined 
   in section 3 for all sessions in a given MEG. For LSPs, SPMEs and 
   sections this is GAL/G-ACh encapsulated BFD using the code points 
   specified in section 3.3. For PWs, this is G-ACh or GAL/G-ACh 
   encapsulated BFD using the code points specified in section 3.3. In 
   this mode, the BFD Control packets are periodically sent at 
   configurable time rate. This rate is a fixed value common for both 
   directions of MEG for the lifetime of the MEG.  

   This document specifies bi-directional BFD for p2p transport LSPs; 
   hence all BFD packets MUST be sent with the M bit clear. 

   There are two modes of operation for bi-directional LSPs. One in 
   which the session state of both directions of the LSP is coordinated 
   and one constructed from BFD sessions in such a way that the two 
   directions operate independently but are still part of the same MEG. 
   A single bi-directional BFD session is used for coordinated 
   operation. Two independent BFD sessions are used for independent 
   operation. It should be noted that independent operation treats 
   session state and defect state as independent entities. For example 
   an independent session can be in the UP state while receiving RDI 
   indication. For a coordinated session, the session state will track 
   the defect state. 

   In coordinated mode, an implementation SHOULD NOT reset 
   bfd.RemoteDiscr until it is exiting the DOWN state.  

   In independent mode, an implementation MUST NOT reset bfd.RemoteDiscr 
   upon transitioning to the DOWN state.  

   Overall operation is as specified in [4] and augmented for MPLS in 
   [8]. Coordinated operation is as described in [4]. Independent 
   operation requires clarification of two aspects of [4]. Independent 
   operation is characterized by the setting of bfd.MinRxInterval to 
   zero by the MEP that is typically the session originator (referred to 
   as the source MEP), and there will be a session originator at either 
   end of the bi-directional LSP. Each source MEP will have a 
   corresponding sink MEP that has been configured to a Tx interval of 
   zero.  

   This memo specifies a preferred interpretation of the base spec on 
   how a MEP with a BFD transmit rate set to zero behaves. One 
   interpretation is that no periodic messages on the reverse component 
   of the bi-directional LSP originate with that MEP, it will only 
   originate messages on a state change.  

 
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   The first clarification is that when a state change occurs a MEP set 
   to a transmit rate of zero sends BFD control messages with a one 
   second period on the reverse component until such time that the state 
   change is confirmed by the session peer. At this point the MEP set to 
   a transmit rate of zero can resume quiescent behavior. This adds 
   robustness to all state transitions in the RxInterval=0 case. 

   The second is that the originating MEP (the one with a non-zero 
   bfd.TxInterval) will ignore a DOWN state received from a zero 
   interval peer. This means that the zero interval peer will continue 
   to send DOWN state messages that include the RDI diagnostic code as 
   the state change is never confirmed. This adds robustness to the 
   exchange of RDI indication on a uni-directional failure (for both 
   session types DOWN with a diagnostic of either control detection 
   period expired or neighbor signaled session down offering RDI 
   functionality). 

   A further extension to the base specification is that there are 
   additional OAM protocol exchanges that act as inputs to the BFD state 
   machine; these are the Link Down Indication [5] and the Lock 
   Instruct/Lock Report transactions; Lock Report interaction being 
   optional. 

3.7.1. Session initiation and Modification 

   Session initiation occurs starting from MinRx = 1 second, MinTx >= 1 
   second and the detect multiplier = 3.  
   Once in the UP state, poll/final discipline is used to modify the 
   periodicity of control message exchange from their default rates to 
   the desired rates and set the detect multiplier to 3.  
   Once the desired rate has been reached using the poll/final 
   mechanism, implementations SHOULD NOT attempt further rate 
   modification. 
   In the rare circumstance where an operator has a reason to further 
   change session parameters, beyond the initial migration from default 
   values; poll/final discipline can be used with the caveat that a peer 
   implementation may consider a session change unacceptable and/or 
   bring the BFD session down via the use of the ADMIN DOWN state. 
    
3.7.2. Defect entry criteria 

   There are further defect criteria beyond those that are defined in 
   [4] to consider given the possibility of mis-connectivity defects. 
   The result is the criteria for a LSP direction to transition from the 

 
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   defect free state to a defect state is a superset of that in the BFD 
   base specification [4]. 
    
   The following conditions cause a MEP to enter the defect state for CC 
   PDUs (in no particular order): 
     1. BFD session times out (loss-of-continuity defect). 
     2. Receipt of a link down indication or lock report. 
 
   And the following will cause the MEP to enter the mis-connectivity 
   defect state for CV operation (again not in any particular order): 
     1. BFD control packets are received with an unexpected 
        encapsulation (mis-connectivity defect), these include: 
          - receiving an IP encoded CC or CV BFD control packet on a 
          LSP configured to use GAL/G-ACh, or vice versa  
          (note there are other possibilities that can also alias as an 
          OAM packet) 
     2. Receipt of an unexpected globally unique Source MEP identifier 
        (Mis-connectivity defect). Note that as each encoding of the 
        Source MEP ID TLV contains unique information (there is no 
        mechanical translation possible between MEP ID formats), receipt 
        of an unexpected source MEP ID type is the same as receiving an 
        unexpected value. 
     3. Receipt of a session discriminator that is not in the local BFD 
        database in the Your Discriminator field (mis-connectivity 
        defect). 
     4. Receipt of a session discriminator that is in the local database 
        but does not have the expected label (mis-connectivity defect). 
     5. IF BFD authentication is used, receipt of a message with 
        incorrect authentication information (password, MD5 digest, or 
        SHA1 hash). 
      
   The effective defect hierarchy (order of checking) is 

     1. Receiving nothing. 

     2. Receiving link down indication. E.g. a local link failure, an 
        MPLS-TP LDI indication, or Lock Report. 

     3. Receiving from an incorrect source (determined by whatever 
        means). 
 
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     4. Receiving from a correct source (as near as can be determined), 
        but with incorrect session information). 

     5. Receiving BFD control packets in all discernable ways correct. 

3.7.3. Defect entry consequent action 

   Upon defect entry a sink MEP will assert signal fail into any client 
   (sub-)layers. It will also communicate session DOWN to its session 
   peer using CC messages.  

   The blocking of traffic as a consequent action MUST be driven only by 
   a defect's consequent action as specified in [13] section 5.1.1.2. 
    

   When the defect is mis-connectivity, the section, LSP or PW 
   termination will silently discard all non-OAM traffic received. The 
   sink MEP will also send a defect indication back to the source MEP 
   via the use of a diagnostic code of mis-connectivity defect to be 
   assigned by IANA. 

3.7.4. Defect exit criteria 

3.7.4.1. Exit from a loss-of-continuity defect 

   For a coordinated session, exit from a loss-of-connectivity defect is 
   as described in figure 7 which updates [4]. 

   For an independent session, exit from a loss-of-connectivity defect 
   occurs upon receipt of a well formed BFD control packet from the peer 
   MEP as described in figures 8 and 9. 

3.7.4.2. Exit from a mis-connectivity defect 

   Exit from a mis-connectivity defect state occurs when no CV messages 
   with mis-connectivity defects have been received for a period of 3.5 
   seconds. 

3.7.5. State machines 

   The following state machines update [4]. They have been modified to 
   include LDI and LKR as specified in [5] as inputs to the state 
   machine and to clarify the behavior for independent mode. LKR is an 
   optional input. 

   The coordinated session state machine has been augmented to indicate 
   LDI and optionally LKR as inputs to the state machine. For a session 
 
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   that is in the UP state, receipt of LDI or optionally LKR will 
   transition the session into the DOWN state. 

                 
                             +--+ 
                             |  | UP, ADMIN DOWN, TIMER, LDI, LKR 
                             |  V 
               DOWN        +------+  INIT 
              +------------|      |------------+ 
              |            | DOWN |            | 
              |  +-------->|      |<--------+  | 
              |  |         +------+         |  | 
              |  |          MISCONNECTIVITY,|  | 
              |  |               ADMIN DOWN,|  | 
              |  |ADMIN DOWN,          DOWN,|  | 
              |  |TIMER               TIMER,|  | 
              V  |LDI,LKR           LDI,LKR |  V 
            +------+                      +------+ 
       +----|      |                      |      |----+ 
   DOWN|    | INIT |--------------------->|  UP  |    |INIT, UP 
       +--->|      | INIT, UP             |      |<---+ 
            +------+                      +------+ 
 
   Figure 7: MPLS CC state machine for coordinated session operation 
    

   For independent mode, there are two state machines. One for the 
   source MEP (which requested bfd.MinRxInterval=0) and the sink MEP 
   (which agreed to bfd.MinRxInterval=0). 
    
   The source MEP will not transition out of the UP state once 
   initialized except in the case of a forced ADMIN DOWN. Hence LDI and 
   optionally LKR do not enter into the state machine transition from 
   the UP state, but do enter into the INIT and DOWN states. 
    
                             +--+ 
                             |  | UP, ADMIN DOWN, TIMER, LDI, LKR 
                             |  V 
               DOWN        +------+  INIT 

 
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              +------------|      |------------+ 
              |            | DOWN |            | 
              |  +-------->|      |<--------+  | 
              |  |         +------+         |  | 
              |  |                          |  | 
              |  |ADMIN DOWN     ADMIN DOWN |  | 
              |  |TIMER,                    |  | 
              |  |LDI,                      |  | 
              V  |LKR                       |  V 
            +------+                      +------+ 
       +----|      |                      |      |----+ 
   DOWN|    | INIT |--------------------->|  UP  |    | INIT, UP, DOWN,  
       +--->|      | INIT, UP             |      |<---+ LDI, LKR 
            +------+                      +------+ 
    
   Figure 8: MPLS CC State machine for source MEP for independent 
   session operation 
                                
   The sink MEP state machine (for which the transmit interval has been 
   set to zero) is modified to: 
    
   1) Permit direct transition from DOWN to UP once the session has been 
   initialized. With the exception of via the ADMIN DOWN state, the 
   source MEP will never transition from the UP state, hence in normal 
   unidirectional fault scenarios will never transition to the INIT 
   state. 
    
                             +--+ 
                             |  | ADMIN DOWN, TIMER, LDI, LKR 
                             |  V 
               DOWN        +------+  INIT, UP 
              +------------|      |------------+ 
              |            | DOWN |            | 
              |  +-------->|      |<--------+  | 
              |  |         +------+         |  | 

 
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              |  |          MISCONNECTIVITY,|  | 
              |  |               ADMIN DOWN,|  | 
              |  |ADMIN DOWN,    TIMER,     |  | 
              |  |TIMER,         DOWN,      |  | 
              |  |LDI,           LDI,       |  V 
             V  |LKR            LKR        |  | 
            +------+                      +------+ 
       +----|      |                      |      |----+ 
   DOWN|    | INIT |--------------------->|  UP  |    |INIT, UP 
       +--->|      | INIT, UP             |      |<---+ 
            +------+                      +------+ 
 
     Figure 9: MPLS CC State machine for the sink MEP for independent 
                             session operation 

3.7.6. Configuration of MPLS-TP BFD sessions 

   Configuration of MPLS-TP BFD session parameters and coordination of 
   same between the source and sink MEPs is out of scope of this memo. 
    
3.7.7. Discriminator values 

   In the BFD control packet the discriminator values have either local 
   to the sink MEP or no significance (when not known). 
    
   My Discriminator field MUST be set to a nonzero value (it can be a 
   fixed value), the transmitted Your Discriminator value MUST reflect 
   back the received value of My Discriminator field or be set to 0 if 
   that value is not known. 
    
   Per RFC5884 Section 7 [8], a node MUST NOT change the value of the My 
   Discriminator" field for an established BFD session. 
     
4. Configuration Considerations 

   The following is an example set of configuration parameters for a BFD 
   session: 
    
   Mode and Encapsulation 
      RFC 5884 - BFD CC in UDP/IP/LSP 
 
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      RFC 5885 - BFD CC in G-ACh 
      RFC 5085 - UDP/IP in G-ACh  
      MPLS-TP - CC/CV in GAL/G-ACh or G-ACh 
    
   For MPLS-TP, the following additional parameters need to be 
   configured: 
   1) Session mode, coordinated or independent 
   2) CC periodicity 
   3) The MEP ID for the MEPs at either end of the LSP 
   4) Whether authentication is enabled (and if so, the associated 
      parameters) 
    
   And the the discriminators used by each MEP, both bfd.LocalDiscr and 
   bfd.RemoteDiscr can optionally be configured or locally assigned. 
   Finally a detect multiplier of 3 is directly inferred from the code 
   points. 
    
5. Acknowledgments 

   Nitin Bahadur, Rahul Aggarwal, Tom Nadeau, Nurit Sprecher and Yaacov 
   Weingarten also contributed to this document. 
    
6. IANA Considerations 

   This draft requires the allocation of two channel types from the IANA 
   "PW Associated Channel Type" registry in RFC4446 [6]. 
         XX1   MPLS-TP CC message 
         XX2   MPLS-TP CV message 
   This draft requires the creations of a source MEP-ID TLV 
   registry. The parent registry will be the "PW Associated Channel 
   Type" registry of RFC4446 [6]. All code points within this 
   registry shall be allocated according to the "Standards Action" 
   procedures as specified in [11]. 

   The initial values are: 

      X1 - Section MEP-ID 

      X2 - LSP MEP-ID 
 
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      X3 - PW MEP-ID 

   The items tracked in the registry will be the type, and the 
   associated name and reference. The source MEP-ID TLV will require 
   standards action registration procedures for additional values. 

   This memo requests a code point from the registry for BFD 
   diagnostic codes [4]: 

      XX -
              - mis-connectivity defect 

7. Security Considerations 

   The use of CV improves network integrity by ensuring traffic is 
   not "leaking" between LSPs.  

   Base BFD foresees an optional authentication section (see [4] 
   section 6.7); that can be applied to this application. Although 
   the source MEP-ID TLV is not included in the BFD authentication 
   digest, there is a chain of trust such that the discriminator 
   associated with the digest is also associated with the expected 
   MEP-ID which will prevent impersonation of CV messages in this 
   application. 

   This memo specifies the use of globally unique identifiers for 
   MEP IDs. This provides absolutely authoritative detection of 
   persistent leaking of traffic between LSPs. Non-uniqueness can 
   result in undetected leaking in the scenario where two LSPs with 
   common MEP IDs are misconnected. This would be considered to be 
   undesirable but rare, it would also be difficult to exploit for 
   malicious purposes as at a  minimum, both a network end point, 
   and a node that was a transit point for the target MEG would 
   need to be compromised. 

8. References 

8.1. Normative References  

  [1]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
        Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 

  [2]   Bocci, M. et al., "MPLS Generic Associated Channel ", RFC 
        5586 , June 2009 

  [3]   Vigoureux, M., Betts, M. and D. Ward, "Requirements for 
        Operations Administration and Maintenance in MPLS 
        Transport Networks", RFC5860, May 2010 

 
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  [4]   Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding 
        Detection", RFC 5880, June 2010 

  [5]   Swallow, G. et al., "MPLS Fault Management OAM", draft-
        ietf-mpls-tp-fault-04 (work in progress), April 2011 

  [6]   Martini, L., "IANA Allocations for Pseudowire Edge to Edge 
        Emulation (PWE3)", RFC 4446, April 2006 

  [7]   Nadeau, T. et al. "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection 
        (BFD) for the Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity 
        Verification (VCCV) ", IETF RFC 5885, June 2010  

  [8]   Aggarwal, R. et.al., "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection 
        (BFD) for MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs)", RFC 5884, 
        June 2010  

  [9]   Bocci, M. and G. Swallow, "MPLS-TP Identifiers", draft-
        ietf-mpls-tp-identifiers-06 (work in progress), June 2011 

  [10]  Nadeau, T, et al., "Pseudowire Virtual Circuit 
        Connectivity Verification (VCCV): A Control Channel for 
        Pseudowires", RFC 5085, December 2007 

  [11]  Narten, T., Alvestrand, H., "Guidelines for Writing an 
        IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", IETF RFC 5226, May 
        2008 

8.2. Informative References 

  [12]  Bocci, M., et al., "A Framework for MPLS in Transport 
        Networks", RFC5921, July 2010 

  [13]  Allan, D., and Busi, I. "MPLS-TP OAM Framework", draft-
        ietf-mpls-tp-oam-framework-11 (work in progress), February 
        2011 

  [14]  Andersson et. al., "OAM Terminology", IETF RFC 6291, June 
        2011 

 







 
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   Authors' Addresses 

   Dave Allan 
   Ericsson 
   Email: david.i.allan@ericsson.com  
    
   John Drake 
   Juniper 
   Email: jdrake@juniper.net 
    
   George Swallow 
   Cisco Systems, Inc. 
   Email: swallow@cisco.com 
    
   Annamaria Fulignoli  
   Ericsson 
   Email: annamaria.fulignoli@ericsson.com 
    
   Sami Boutros  
   Cisco Systems, Inc. 
   Email: sboutros@cisco.com 
    
   Martin Vigoureux  
   Alcatel-Lucent 
   Email: martin.vigoureux@alcatel-lucent.com 
    
   Siva Sivabalan 
   Cisco Systems, Inc. 
   Email: msiva@cisco.com 
    
   David Ward 
   Juniper 
   Email: dward@juniper.net 
    
   Robert Rennison 
   ECI Telecom 
   Email: robert.rennison@ecitele.com 











 
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